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Between June 1997 and September 1998 collaborative research on
fisheries management in Central Maluku, Indonesia, was carried out by
Hualopu Foundation, Pattimura University and the International Center
for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM) (Manila).1 The
focus of the research was the inventory and institutional analysis of the
traditional management system called sasi, but studies of formal govern-
ment management as well as of the fish harvesting and marketing systems
were also carried out. The result is a lengthy report (Novaczek & Harkes
1999) which can be obtained from ICLARM by those wishing to see the
detailed data that back up the findings. What we present below is the
executive summary of the research.
1 The Maluku fisheries
The marine resources of central Maluku are very rich but are under se-
vere pressure, particularly from destructive fishing techniques. After a
period of rapid increase in fishing pressure and catches, there is now clear
evidence of overfishing of several important commercial stocks (shrimp,
skipjack, small pelagics) and therefore a need for more cautious manage-
ment. Nevertheless, economic pressures provide a strong incentive for
further expansion of fisheries.
The fishery is numerically dominated by artisanal fisher-farmers hav-
ing low-technology boats and fishing gear and limited formal educa-
tion. It is the artisanal and small-scale sectors of several islands of central
Maluku (Haruku, Ambon, Saparua, Nusalaut and Seram) which are the
topic of this research. When a sample of 508 fishers was divided into age
classes (<45, 45-60, >60) it was noted that the younger fishers include a
1This research was funded by the International Development Research Center.
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relatively greater proportion of Muslims than are apparent in older gen-
erations of fishers. Younger fishers are also more focused on deep water
pelagic resources. Fishers are also moving from the artisanal to the small
scale sector and onto larger commercial vessels as crew.
Both artisanal fishers and commercial crew earn marginal incomes,
have no say over fish prices, and are unorganized. Profit sharing systems
that are in place provide incentives to fishers to maximize catch, if neces-
sary through use of destructive gear such as very fine mesh nets. At the
same time, enforcement of national fisheries regulations is lax and there
are serious deficiencies in government management agencies in terms
of motivation, coordination, knowledge, infrastructure and funding sup-
port. Local village institutions which sometimes manage fisheries (sasi),
are well respected by the majority of fishers, whether they live in a village
which has the institution or not, but have less credence with the younger,
commercially oriented fishers.
The majority of rural, coastal villagers are still directly or indirectly
dependent on the fishery. They clearly recognize that inshore and pelagic
fisheries resources in Maluku are in decline. Ninety six percent of 508
fishers surveyed reported declining catches, with an average decline of
over 30% in the past 15 years. Fewer than 10% encourage their children
to enter the fishery even though they themselves find it to be a fulfill-
ing occupation. Fishers also report an overall decline in social interaction
and cooperation and compliance to fisheries rules. Collapsing inshore
fish catches have driven subsistence fishers ever farther out to sea and
future conflict with commercial sectors is inevitable if management and
conflict resolution arrangements are not set in place. In particular, fishers
see the explosion in the numbers of large fishing vessels, fish aggregating
devices and floating lift nets, as well as more efficient modern gear, as the
root of their fisheries’ problems. They also are quick to point to degra-
dation in the marine environment such as damage from blast and poison
fishing and water pollution, as factors. However, fishers in general do not
perceive that management options are available to redress the situation.
They also still consider ocean resources to be unlimited, even though lo-
cal resources may be depleted. They see the solution to declining catches
as being an increase in their fishing power (bigger boats and motors). In
other words, if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em!
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NGO and academic researchers, noting these trends, have begun to
push government to look for ways to revive or establish local manage-
ment, with sasi, a traditional resource management institution, as the ba-
sis. We explore relationships between the sasi institution and contextual
factors of central Maluku to see whether sasi is a useful model or basis for
future local management. Because case studies were carried out only in
Christian villages, the findings below are not necessarily true for Muslim
villages.
2 Societal context of fisheries management
Social and political structures in the Christian villages of central Maluku
reflect the centralized and hierarchical national structures. Decision-
making processes involving higher government levels are not open for
local input, nor are local decision-making processes participatory. The
leaders have little confidence in the abilities of common villagers. En-
vironmental groups, which are outside of the government and church
hierarchies, are rare. Indonesian citizens are trained to identify with the
state rather than with local groups. Although similar types of organiza-
tional structures (church, government and adat [traditional] institutions
and organizations) are found in most of the villages, there are differences
in terms of the relative role of adat leaders in village society and govern-
ment. Villages in the study area range from relatively isolated, highly tra-
ditional rural communities where adat leadership is paramount, to more
modern urban satellite villages where adat leaders lack significant influ-
ence. Kewang, an adat enforcement organization, plays a central role in
village resource management in the more traditional villages with an ac-
tive sasi institution. sasi is a system under which particular areas, crops or
resources on land or in the sea may be put under harvest prohibition for
limited periods. Kewang members, selected under rules that vary from
place to place, act as unoffical police, guarding those crops and marine
resources which are under sasi.
The spread and functionality of village organizations, whether church,
government or adat, is dependent on 1) provision of economic benefits,
2) broad support by the villagers, 3) stable leadership and 4) the ability to
stay at arms length from village politics. Church organizations are most
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stable but as their spiritual aim is more important than economic bene-
fits, membership is limited. Government groups are often dominated by
upper classes and are most vulnerable to political instability, for instance
when a village chief is elected with a slim majority and faces a strong
opposition. adat organizations may either be supported by church and
government powers, as in Nolloth on Saparua Island, or there may be a
power struggle among the authorities which leads to the disappearance or
weakening of adat, as reported in a number of the 63 villages documented.
If village leadership is not perceived to be legitimate, village organizations
that are typically headed by the village leader or his wife, become dormant
or dysfunctional. Thus, functionality of government and adat groups is
highly dependent on the presence of a culturally legitimate and strong vil-
lage leader. Because village government leaders are used to taking orders
from above rather than initiating action, future local management institu-
tions must be supported by higher government levels. Village leaders will
need assistance and incentives to be proactive and creative in developing
new management arrangements. The institution must be meaningful
to ordinary villagers, provide economic benefits (preferably direct), and
for stability should be linked to the tiga tungku (three hearthstones, ie,
church, state and adat ) but at the same time buffered from direct impacts
of political strife and changing village leadership.
3 Local management institutions
Coastal villages typically claim de facto rights of access and withdrawal
over fairly extensive areas of both land and sea. Sasi, the local institution
under which some fishing activities are regulated, is nested in traditional
culture, called adat, which lays down the basic ethics and codes of con-
duct. In other words, the constitutional rules of sasi are part of adat. As
an institution, sasi has never been static but has changed with the times.
sasi and the underlying adat culture have waxed and waned, absorbing
and reflecting the impacts of colonialism, war, economic development
and social change. Despite past predictions of imminent demise, both
sasi and adat persist and in 1997, sasi is still widely supported and believed
to be a good thing, even in villages where the institution no longer func-
tions. The spiritual aspects of sasi, its cultural legitimacy, ceremonies, and
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the relationship to indigenous tenure rights all encourage support by the
community. Modern village leaders are often attracted to sasi as a cul-
turally acceptable basis for collection of resource rents to support local
government.
The majority of the 63 central Maluku villages documented (these
include every village on the islands of Haruku, Saparua and Nusalaut,
half of the rural coastal villages of Ambon island and a small number on
Seram) still retain some form of local sasi institution but only a quarter
have rules pertaining to marine management. sasi practices vary from vil-
lage to village. In the case of marine resource management (marine sasi) a
village may or may not have, for example, rules restricting gear types, ac-
cess restrictions for specific areas, restrictions on the size of shellfish to be
harvested, prohibitions on destruction of coral or mangroves. The gov-
erning and enforcing authorities may be adat, church, local government
and/or private individuals holding harvest rights. The character and le-
gitimacy of the village chief (kepala desa) is the key to successful function
of the institution because he holds ultimate decision-making authority.
There is often, but not always, a kewang to patrol sasi areas, and catch
and prosecute rule breakers. In villages where sasi has evolved into an al-
most purely commercial transaction, the kewang are no longer traditional
leaders. Collective choice rules, a mixture of tradition and modern inno-
vation, define how the players in sasi work together. The operational rules
of marine sasi regulate day-to-day activities in the marine territory and/or
sasi area. These operational rules may be indigenous or may mimic na-
tional legislation, and are subject to revision. This adaptivity is important
to the resilience of the institution but has also led to the development of
a patchwork of marine management efforts lacking a unified purpose and
also lacking a set of minimum standards.
Marine sasi is most prevalent in mid-sized villages distant from the
urban centre of Ambon. In no case is management under sasi compre-
hensive; only small areas of shallow water and few species (most often
Trochus, sea cucumbers and small pelagics; less often corals, mangroves
and various small shellfish) are regulated. Nevertheless, the existence
of sasi means that certain important management concepts are widely
known and valued as part of local culture. Using sasi as the basis for
development of a modern management institution can therefore be con-
54 CAKALELE, VOL. 10
Figure 1: Fishing Villages and Sasi
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sidered to be efficient as it reduces potential costs of public education and
enforcement.
Government staff generally agree that local institutions are useful
and hold a strategic position close to the resource and to fishers. Also,
younger fishers especially tend to see the community as having responsi-
bility for management. However, sasi and kewang lack formal legal status
and they are effectively isolated from regional, provincial and national
management structures. The kewang as a group have no role in the pro-
cess of planning for fisheries development nor in the process of develop-
ing provincial fisheries policy and regulations.
Stakeholders are motivated to comply or cooperate with the sasi insti-
tution according to the incentives and options inherent in their situation.
The outcome of the interaction between the management institution and
resource users was assessed in terms of social and biological sustainability,
and the efficiency and equitability of management.
Equity in terms of access to resources is not a major issue because
sasi covers few species and small areas. sasi also has no affect on distribu-
tion of fishing gears or on economic disparities. However, fishers are not
neutral about equity issues in cases where harvest rights are sold or auc-
tioned. If benefits are not seen to be fairly distributed or if they accrue to
outsiders this can lead to non-compliance but where the decision-makers
are respected and use the proceeds for community development, this ar-
rangement can be very efficient and also reasonably equitable. Where
marine resources under sasi are harvested as a communal crop and dis-
tributed equitably among the population, fishers do not complain.
Fishers perceive control over resource management to be tighter in
sasi villages, and compliance to fisheries rules is greater. Communal deci-
sion making process is also stronger and more stable. Although decisions
are said to be made “by the community”, the voices of fishers may or
may not be heeded, and women are excluded. sasi is therefore not equi-
table in this sense. Common fishers in sasi villages feel no more involved
in decision-making than fishers in non-sasi villages. However, the hi-
erarchical structure is very efficient and culturally acceptable as long as
leadership is strong and legitimate.
Sasi has no impact on the economic status of individual artisanal fish-
ers, probably because the resources managed under sasi constitute a rela-
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tively small proportion of family income. The major difference between
sasi and non-sasi villages is in terms of social sustainability. Generally
there are fewer trends of deterioration through time in sasi villages. Fish-
ers in sasi villages felt that there was a strong tradition of collective action,
greater discussion of village issues and greater harmony. Social sustain-
ability, especially family well-being and income, is positively influenced
by whether fishers are members of village organisations and satisfied with
their jobs.
There was no evidence that sasi had any impact on the health of the
fishery in general, doubtless because sasi pertains only to small, inshore
areas and most fish are caught in the deep sea. Both sasi and non-sasi
villages suffer from blast fishing. sasi areas are also vulnerable to damage
caused by external forces such as mining exploration. At a local level,
guarded sasi areas suffer less damage than adjacent unguarded areas. On
a regional level, however, coral reef condition is more closely related to
population density and fishing pressure than to presence or absence of
the sasi institution. More research into the condition of a larger number
of guarded sasi areas would be useful.
Sasi has demonstrable benefits in protecting the shellfish Trochus niloti-
cus (lola) and sea cucumbers (teripang). Although there was suitable habitat
and a history of exploitation in non-sasi villages, teripang and lola were ex-
tremely rare. This suggests that lola and teripang may now be largely con-
fined to sasi areas which are subject to harvest restrictions and guarded.
Socio-economic variables correlated with the performance indicators
for sasi included the style of village decision-making, job satisfaction, be-
lief in the importance of sasi; attitudes towards changing and bending
rules and selling harvest rights, the type of gear owned, external income
and economic score, and whether fishers are part of village groups and/or
are involved in communal fishing (see Table 1). Interestingly, resource
health was not directly related to the desire to change rules. Fishers with
more expensive gears feel they have more say in decision-making.
Surveys reveal that fishers in general find it important that all stake-
holders are represented in decision-making. Fishers who feel that village
decision-making is based on consensus or majority agreement have more
positive scores on all performance indicators. For a management sys-
tem it is thus important that the decision-making process is perceived
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Table 1.1: Performance indicators
Equity Role of fish-
ers in man-
agement
The degree of influence that fishers




The individual access that fishers
have to marine resources
Distribution
of fishing gear
Is division of (expensive) fishing
gear among the fishers fair?
Economic
equality
The distribution of income (dispar-




The degree to which villagers are




The costs and/or fees that need to be
paid before people can start fishing
Control over
access
The ability of people to define who










Degree of well-being in terms of
housing, food, and health




The occurrence of communal activ-
ities in the village (e.g. construction
of roads and houses)
Discussion of
village issues
The degree to which village issues
are openly discussed in the village
Community
harmony






Resource state ie, coral health,
numbers of fish, water clarity, etc.
Fish catch The amount and size of fish caught
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to be inclusive. Insulation of the management institution from village
politics is also important. Where formal and traditional leaders collabo-
rate closely, and where leadership is highly legitimate, sasi thrives. What
makes the sasi institution strong (and thus resilient) is that which links
the various players and components ie, legitimacy, trust, collaboration,
transparency, etc. A shared notion of the relevance of the institution is
also needed to stimulate a common objective to maintain sasi in spite of
external influences.
Sasi provides a valuable example in that it has proven that rules per-
taining to gear types, access, closed areas and seasons, etc. can be suc-
cessfully developed and applied at the local level by villagers who have
relatively low levels of formal education as well as only a hazy concept
of resource management per se. In the absence of a science-based ratio-
nale for management, an ethic of working together for the benefit of the
community, attachment to a cultural tradition and the tendency to com-
ply with sanctions based in religious beliefs have in this case combined to
form the basis of a resilient and, within its narrow scope of application,
demonstrably effective institution. Whether this degree of success can be
replicated at a larger scale, or in the context of more modern, culturally
heterogeneous communities, has yet to be seen.
Sasi also provides an alternative to the western idea that local manage-
ment must be highly democratic and inclusive. The paternalistic model is
potentially very efficient and cost-effective, putting little demand on the
time of busy fishers, farmers and women, and is also, at least for now, cul-
turally acceptable. What is important is not to further entrench current
elites by allowing the system to become inflexible and non-transparent.
Should democratic ideals and gender equality one day become the norm,
the management institution must be able to evolve to accommodate in-
creased need for participation.
Various contextual realities are at work around the revitalization of sasi
as a management institution. The national ethic of non-questioning obe-
dience to central authority prompts village leaders to do nothing but the
potential to collect resource rents through sasi makes reviving the institu-
tion very attractive. For fishers themselves the incentives are more linked
to culture than to a consciousness of the need for management. Strong
market demand coupled with high dependence on the fishery make vil-
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lagers wary of management that might restrict access or impose catch
limits. On the other hand, competition among sectors may push artisanal
fishers to organize themselves and demand clear access and withdrawal
rights on pelagic fishing grounds.
The perpetuation of sasi (as opposed to introduction of a totally new
institution), especially if it includes religious leaders, would be an asset
in that compliance would be encouraged. With a local institution involv-
ing respected traditional and religious leaders, resource users would feel
secure. However, loss of interest of younger generations and the subse-
quent loss of sasi knowledge linked to adat is a threat to sasi as a cultural
institution and could therefore undermine its effectiveness as a resource
management structure. It is important to ascertain the importance of tra-
ditional language and ritual, and how much needs to be incorporated into
a revitalized institution.
Modern village institutions should provide a transparent, inclusive
decision-making process, mechanisms to change rules, mechanisms to
enforce rules, direct benefits for the fisher-managers, a funding base (part
of which could be generated by village organizations), and a stable man-
agement structure that includes, but is not dependent upon, the village
government. The needs and aspirations of the various proponents (fish-
ers, local governments, fisheries managers, adat leaders, environmental-
ists) must be successsfully accomodated. Local institutions need to be
involved not only in local monitoring and enforcement but also as part-
ners in development planning and implementation, stock assessment and
allocation, licensing etc. In addition, to have a place in negotiating access
and withdrawal rights for artisanal fishers in offshore waters, local institu-
tions will need to engage or be nested in a larger institution operating on
regional, provincial and higher levels. Presently, there is no identifiable
lead agency dedicated to coastal and fisheries management in Maluku.
Factors which contribute positively to the resilience of sasi as a lo-
cal institution should be considered during the process of modernizing
local management. For instance, the legitimacy of a village chief who
descends from the raja line contributes positively to the execution of his
authority with regard to sasi. A large overlap between the traditional and
formal authorities in the village government is also beneficial, and ac-
knowledgement of the traditional village authorities within formal gov-
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ernment is vital to revitalization of sasi. Where traditional institutions are
acknowledged, enforcement of sasi regulations is more effective. Formal
and traditional institutions should also collaborate closely with religious
authorities. Where there are strong bonds among these institutions, sasi
is highly resilient. On the other hand, political instability and weak lead-
ership seriously hamper sasi as well as any revitalization process.
For optimal collaboration between kewang and the police in enforce-
ment, a clear definition of rights and mandates should be developed. sasi
regulations are considered more legitimate and compliance increases if
the villagers profit directly from management. It is necessary to define
the sasi structures, powers and responsibilities within the framework of
provincial and national legislation, to provide local institutionswith more
capacity to deal with external threats and become involved in develop-
ment planning, execution and evaluation.
Collaboration requires a shared value system, in this case adat. Where
through modernization the younger generation develops new values, the
institution must adapt. Collaboration, trust and legitimacy are a function
of a village size and homogeneity. In larger, more heterogeneous villages
another type of management institution ie, not traditional sasi, needs to
be established. While revamping the institution to increase functional-
ity in resource management, it will be useful to retain traditional titles
and structures as well as elements of ceremony, to provide a strong spiri-
tual and cultural basis. However, care must be taken not to alienate new
generations of fishers.
The 1990s appear to be a critical decade, ie, sasi must adapt to modern
society and gain formal legal status or it may, at the operational level,
cease to function. There are various options for providing a legal basis
for local management bodies, including drafting of new provincial laws
or amending existing national legislation (Zerner 1992).
In conclusion, the sasi institution has sufficient benefits that it can and
should be used as the basis for building local level management institu-
tions. Sasi, however, takes many forms and it requires further study to
determine the optimal configuration. Extension of the inventory would
provide a better picture of how widespread sasi and other village-level
management efforts are. It would also be worthwhile to investigate the
motivations of blast fishers and the influence of sasi and adat on this activ-
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ity. Case studies to clarify the role of adat and religious leaders, to identify
key contextual factors and incentives, and to study resilience in Muslim
villages are needed. There is also a need to follow up on progress of
revitalization in Hulaliu, Tuhaha and other sites.
More detailed biological assessments inside and outside of guarded
sasi areas would be extremely useful in quantifying the impact of different
forms of sasi. Is habitat better protected when harvest rights are auctioned
or sold and then protected by private guards or when they are guarded by
a kewang? Which fisheries’ rules directly or indirectly protect fisheries
habitat and to what degree? Biological research should also be performed
comparing sasi areas of different sizes in order to investigate impacts on
fish numbers and diversity. Is there an optimal size for a protected area?
Would no-take zones located in or near sasi areas increase productivity?
Once more information is available, a small number of alternative
sasi-based institutions could be devised, combining what appear to be the
best attributes of traditional institutions now in place. These alternatives
could then be tested at pilot sites and results fed in to fisheries policy and
legal reform.
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